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Stock Market Reactions and CSR Disclosure in the Context of Negative 
CSR Events 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses stock market reactions after the occurrence of major negative corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) events and the possibility of mitigating these effects through the upfront provision 
of CSR information in firms’ annual reports. For this purpose, we follow a three-step procedure. First, 
we analyse the major concerns gathered from REPRisk® data via event study analysis. Herein, we cover 
a window of 5 to 20 days. Second, we analyse all annual reports of the firms mentioned in the covered 
period over the entire time horizon and conduct a textual analysis to examine firms’ disclosure of CSR 
information. Finally, we draw conclusions from the two approaches and show that firms with more 
upfront CSR information suffer from stronger negative market reactions after the occurrence of a 
negative CSR event. Herein, we show that if the occurrence of a negative CSR event conflicts with 
investors’ expectations, then it leads to an important update of investors’ beliefs about firms’ prospects. 
Our results also confirm that such an event leads to an adjustment of the subsequent year’s CSR 
disclosure in the annual reports. 
JEL: G12, G14, G15, G24, M14, M41, D21, L21, D84 
Keywords: Capital Markets, Corporate Social Responsibility, CSR disclosure, CSR event, Event Study, 
Textual Analysis, CSR Reporting, Shareholder Value 
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1. Introduction 
There is a substantial body of research that has investigated market reactions after the occurrence of 
critical events relating to corporate social responsibility (CSR). Examples of such events include waste 
mismanagement lawsuits (Muoghalu, Robison, and Glascock (1990), environmental crises and incidents 
(Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996; Laplante & Lanoie, 1994), chemical incidents (Blacconiere & Patten, 
1994; Capelle-Blancard & Laguna, 2010), negative CSR events (Kruger, 2015), oil spills (Heflin & 
Wallace, 2017), and human rights violations (Jacobs & Singhal, 2017). Some of these studies focus on 
single incidents and examine intra-industry market reactions (Blacconiere & Patten, 1994; Heflin & 
Wallace, 2017). Other studies examine market reactions for a sample of different firms directly affected 
by the event (Kruger, 2015). Almost all of these studies tend to reveal negative market reactions 
following negative CSR-related events, thereby confirming that such incidents negatively affect 
investors’ perceptions of future firm performance. 
However, there has been relatively little research on the role of CSR disclosure in firms’ annual reports 
in this setting. In this respect, Blacconiere and Patten (1994) examined the intra-industry market 
reactions following the Union Carbide chemical leak in Bhopal, India. They showed that firms with 
superior environmental disclosure prior to the chemical leak suffered less negative stock market 
reactions. Heflin and Wallace (2017) found similar findings in the context of the BP oil spill in the Gulf 
of Mexico in 2010. Their findings suggest that CSR disclosure increases investors’ trust in a firm’s 
ability to handle potential future consequences resulting from these intra-industry crises. Thus, firms 
can mitigate negative market reactions by demonstrating their superior CSR performance through 
increased disclosure before the occurrence of a negative event. 
However, whether this finding also prevails for firms that are directly affected by a negative CSR event 
is both theoretically and empirically unclear. To put it more practically, is the decline in BP’s stock price 
after the oil spill affected by the perception of BP’s prior CSR disclosure? From a theoretical perspective, 
both directions are possible. On the one hand, the market might react less severely in the case of higher 
levels of CSR disclosure due to enhanced investors’ trust in firms’ handling of the catastrophe. On the 
other hand, since the occurrence of the negative CSR-related event is in sharp contrast to investors’ 
expectations based on prior CSR disclosure, it might lead to an update of investors’ beliefs about firms’ 
prospects and thus sharper market reactions. 
Against the background of these mixed theoretical predictions, our study provides further clarification 
on the role of CSR disclosure in the context of negative CSR-related events. Our sample comprises 
1,581 negative CSR-related major events, retrieved from the REPRisk® database and categorized into 
environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) events. First, we examine the stock market 
reactions following these events. Specifically, we refer to event study techniques and examine abnormal 
returns, as well as cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
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(CAARs) around the events within certain topics. This research design is useful in overcoming 
endogeneity problems, particularly the issue of reverse causality. In addition, the staggered occurrence 
of such events mitigates the concerns that typically arise from single-event studies. Consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Heflin & Wallace, 2017; Kruger, 2015, etc.), we find significant negative abnormal returns 
following the occurrence of negative CSR-related events. Thus, investors react negatively to negative 
CSR events. 
In a second step, we analyse whether there is a relationship between the (prior-event) extent of CSR 
disclosure in firms’ annual reports and the market reactions following the event. We use textual analysis 
to measure the extent of CSR disclosure in a firm’s annual reports. For this purpose, we draw on the 
methodology originally developed by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2014) and further refined by Hummel, 
Mittelbach-Hoermanseder, Cho, and Matten (2017) and examine the extent of disclosure of ESG issues 
in a firm’s annual reports. Our results reveal negative correlations between a firm’s extent of prior social 
and governance disclosure and the subsequent abnormal returns around the negative event. Thus, firms 
with more topic-specific CSR information prior to the event suffer stronger negative market reactions, 
which supports the second theoretical reasoning. This finding is contrary to those of Blacconiere and 
Patten (1994) and Heflin and Wallace (2017), thereby showing that only firms that are not directly 
affected by a negative CSR event, e.g., through an industry shock, can mitigate market reactions through 
prior disclosure. If the CSR event is firm-specific, it is in sharp contrast to investors’ expectations 
(formed on the basis of prior disclosure), leading to an important update of investors’ beliefs about firms’ 
prospects. However, for environmental disclosure, we do not find significant correlations. 
Third, we also examine the relationship between the abnormal returns following the event and CSR 
disclosure in the subsequent year. Such disclosure is useful for re-establishing investors’ trust in firms’ 
ability to handle the disaster. Consistent with this reasoning, prior studies document that intra-industry 
disclosure increases following the occurrence of a negative CSR-related event (Heflin & Wallace, 2017; 
Patten, 1992). Our results not only document an increase in disclosure but also show that this increase 
is stronger for stronger negative market reactions. Thus, it appears that firms attempt to mitigate negative 
market reactions and re-establish trust among investors through increased CSR disclosure in subsequent 
years. 
Overall, the contribution of this article is manifold. First, we support prior studies’ findings by providing 
large-scale empirical evidence on the translation of CSR news into market reactions. Given the 
substantial negative market reactions that we document in our study, this finding provides a clear answer 
to the “does it pay to be green” question. Second, we discuss whether and how CSR disclosure affects 
market reactions by shaping investors’ expectations. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two 
studies that link CSR disclosure to an event study of market reactions: that of Blacconiere and Patten 
(1994); and Heflin and Wallace (2017). While these studies focus on intra-industry reactions, our study 
complements the existing findings by focusing on firms that are directly affected by the (firm-specific) 
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events. Third, we also expand the literature by showing not only that firms adapt their CSR disclosure 
after the occurrence of these events but that this adaption depends on the strength of prior market 
reactions. Regarding the practical contributions arising from our research, we would like to call the 
attention of firms to the importance of truthful and reasonable CSR disclosure. Specifically, we caution 
firms to create overly positive perceptions of their CSR performance through CSR disclosure since such 
a disclosure strategy can backfire in the case of the occurrence of a negative CSR event. 
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, the theoretical background of our study is presented, 
along with our hypotheses. In Section 3, we introduce the research design, including the data, event 
study methodology, and our method for deriving textual variables from the annual reports via content 
analysis. Here, we focus on ESG issues. In Section 4, the results are presented, and their political and 
economic interpretations are discussed. Finally, Section 5 draws together the main findings and 
concludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.1. Market reactions to CSR events and concerns 
Several general articles focus on CSR activities or concerns that are directly announced through news 
channels. For example, Muoghalu et al. (1990) were the first to focus on environmental aspects, such as 
the impact of waste mismanagement lawsuits on stockholder returns, via the event study method. They 
show that in the case of a negative return because of a lawsuit, the profitability of waste mismanagement 
is reduced. Moreover, they detect a clear relationship between low penalties and incentives for the illegal 
disposal of waste. Furthermore, Laplante and Lanoie (1994) extend this approach by investigating 
whether shareholders’ expectations are adjusted after similar environmental events. They distinguish 
between two different categories of events: “the announcement of environmental incidents likely to lead 
to a lawsuit” and “the announcement of investments in emissions control equipment.” They find that the 
latter leads to a significant decrease in the equity value of the firms, whereas for lawsuits, the negative 
reaction accompanies the announcement of suit settlements and not the announcement of the lawsuits 
themselves per se. 
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) develop a theoretical model that describes the relation between 
environmental management and financial performance, which is tested via an event study. They find 
significant positive returns in the case of positive environmental events, such as winning performance 
awards, but significant negative returns, where there is weak environmental management during an 
environmental crisis. Additionally, Rao and Hamilton (1996) analyse the effect of ethics and 
profitability via a measure of environmental pollution. They find that firms with higher pollution show 
lower returns than expected from the asset-pricing model; thus, investors gain less than the expected 
risk adjusted rate of return. Blacconiere and Northcut (1997) analyse the stock market reaction towards 
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the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act in 1986. They find that the reaction is lower for 
firms with strong environmental disclosure, whereas “firms with greater exposure to Superfund costs” 
show a strong negative market reaction. In this context, Frooman (1997) and Endrikat (2016) provide a 
good overview of previous CSR event studies, encompassing 27 research articles up to 1997. 
More recently, Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005) show that financial losses due to environmental events 
are primarily driven by legal and regulatory penalties and not, as often expected, affected by reputational 
losses. In their work, they confirm that environmental lawsuits accompany statistically significant losses 
in the market price of a firm, but these lawsuits are always in line with the legal penalties imposed. 
Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) analyse serious chemical market incidents and their respective 
financial market reactions over a period ranging from 1990 to 2005. They find that in their sample, 
firms’ market value drops by 1.3% during the first two days after the event, which increases with the 
seriousness of the accident. 
Arya and Zhang (2009) analyse CSR announcements in the emerging stock market in South Africa 
between 1996 and 2005. They find that, in general, “CSR announcements of substantive monetary value 
result in significantly higher shareholder returns,” which is especially expressed at the end of their 
considered time horizon. Groening and Kanuri (2013) analyse more than 1,000 positive and negative 
social events (e.g., the addition of strong retirement benefits for employees vs. employee health and 
safety concerns) via an event study. They do not find a consistent effect of positive or negative declared 
events, i.e., negative events can also bring about positive financial rewards, and vice versa. Thus, they 
conclude that stakeholder and shareholder perceptions are not necessarily the same. In the same year, 
Kölbel and Busch (2013) analyse the effects of negative news in related CSR topics on credit risk. For 
a sample of US and European firms, they show that negative media attention is associated with greater 
credit default swap spreads. Kruger (2015) focuses on both negative and positive CSR events (retrieved 
from the KLD database). Remarkably, Kruger (2015) shows that investors react negatively to both 
negative and positive CSR events. Recently, Jacobs and Singhal (2017) have analysed stock market 
reactions among Western textile retailers after the collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh, 
which resulted in 1,133 deaths and 2,438 injured workers. Despite the devastating magnitude of the 
collapse, this event is not associated with significant direct costs for Western retailers due to the 
outsourcing of textile production. Nevertheless, the authors document weak negative stock market 
reactions for the event day, but these reactions subsequently dissipate. 
Against the background of this strong empirical evidence, we argue that the occurrence of negative CSR-
related events negatively affects investors’ perceptions of future firm performance. Such events typically 
imply significant immediate and future expenditures due to clean-up, warranty and compensation 
claims, investments for restoring reputation and customer trust, fines and future regulatory 
intensifications. Therefore, we formally posit the following hypothesis: 
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H1. Firms that encounter a negative CSR-related event experience negative market reactions 
subsequent to the event. 
2.2. CSR disclosure as news and adjustments of disclosure because of news 
Voluntary disclosure theory suggests a positive relationship between CSR performance and CSR 
disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983). More precisely, it is argued that firms with superior CSR performance 
are incentivized to disclose CSR information to increase their market value. As a consequence, a 
considerable number of studies reveal positive relationships between (voluntary) CSR disclosure and 
firm value (Clarkson, Fang, Li, & Richardson, 2013; D. Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2014; D. S. 
Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; Plumlee, Brown, Hayes, & Marshall, 2015; Richardson & Welker, 
2001). Despite this substantial body of research on the relationships among CSR performance, CSR 
disclosure and firm value, relatively little is currently known about how firm-specific CSR events and 
their respective market reactions influence (firm-specific) CSR disclosure. 
There is some empirical evidence revealing that firms can mitigate negative market reactions through 
CSR disclosure prior to the event. Among the first studies is that of Blacconiere and Patten (1994), who 
focus on Union Carbide’s chemical leak in Bhopal (India) in 1984, which resulted in 4,000 deaths and 
200,000 injuries. Blacconiere and Patten (1994) reveal significant negative intra-industry market 
reactions for chemical firms. These market reactions are less negative for firms with more extensive 
environmental disclosure prior to the event. The authors interpret their findings in a way that 
environmental disclosure increases investors’ trust in firms’ handling of future regulatory costs. 
Similar findings are obtained by Heflin and Wallace (2017), who study the intra-industry market 
reactions of the BP oil spill in 2010. They show that firms with greater environmental disclosure are less 
affected by negative market reactions after the oil spill. The authors reason that investors perceive “firms 
with more environmental disclosure [to be] better prepared to address future environmental regulations 
and less likely to experience similar environmental incidents.” 
Taken together, the results of prior empirical studies tend to suggest that firms can mitigate negative 
market reactions following a negative CSR-related event through their prior-event CSR disclosure 
(Blacconiere & Patten, 1994; Heflin & Wallace, 2017). However, this finding is limited to intra-industry 
market reactions, i.e., the analysis is provided only for firms that are not directly involved in the event; 
thus, our article expands the current research state. We investigate the effects of firms being directly 
involved in an event. In general, firms’ CSR disclosure should be aimed at maintaining or increasing 
investors’ and stakeholders’ trust. For firms with higher CSR intensity, Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo 
(2017) confirm that during the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009, the market reaction was lower for firms 
with higher CSR activities (measured using the MSCI ESG score). Thus, focusing only on CSR events, 
there are two possible relationships: on the one hand, one might argue that negative CSR events lead to 
negative effects caused by reputation loss or unfulfilled expectations with respect to the provided CSR 
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disclosure, which is not reliable. However, on the other hand, it could be argued that if there is no clear 
negative financial effect in terms of fines or direct losses, this could lead to no market reaction; 
moreover, in the case of positive (prospective) future cash flows, positive abnormal returns also occur. 
Based on these opposing theoretical predictions and limited empirical evidence, we therefore posit a 
non-directional hypothesis: 
H2: There is a relationship between firms’ prior-event CSR disclosure and market reactions following 
the event. 
In addition to their findings on the relationship between CSR disclosure and market reactions, Heflin 
and Wallace (2017) also document an increase in environmental disclosure in the year following the oil 
spill, particularly among firms with poor past environmental performance. 
Such spillovers from the incident onto the disclosure in the consecutive year have already been 
documented by Patten (1992). The author investigates the environmental disclosure of petroleum firms 
after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Patten (1992) also finds a significant increase in the environmental 
disclosure of the petroleum firms after the oil spill (excluding the disclosure of Exxon), although most 
of these firms are not directly involved in the oil spill. 
More recently, Blanc, Branco, Cho, and Sopt (2013) investigate the CSR disclosure of the German 
multinational enterprise Siemens, which embraced a very large corruption scandal in 2006, over a period 
of eleven years. The authors find both symbolic and substantive actions in Siemens’ CSR disclosure. In 
general, they report an increase in the disclosure of corruption directly after the event, which is followed 
by a continuous decrease in disclosure in the following years. 
Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that the occurrence of a negative CSR-related event leads to 
increases in CSR disclosure in subsequent years. This evidence is found for both firms that are directly 
and not directly involved in the event (Blanc et al., 2013; Heflin & Wallace, 2017). In the aftermath of 
a negative CSR event, firms attempt to maintain or re-establish investors’ trust in their CSR performance 
through increased disclosure.1 The more severe (i.e., negative) the market reactions are that the firm 
experiences following the crisis, the stronger the incentives to re-establish investors’ trust and thus the 
stronger the increase in disclosure. We therefore posit the following hypothesis: 
H3: There is a negative relationship between market reactions following the event and firms’ subsequent 
CSR disclosure. 
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3. Research design 
3.1. Sample selection 
The event data, which are provided by REPRisk®, covering the major concerns over the period 2011-
2014, are gathered as the starting point of the analysis. More precisely, we refer to REPRISK® “major 
controversies,” i.e., the substantial negative ESG-related events covered in the REPRisk® database. By 
analysing each event in detail, they are manually attributed to one of the three ESG categories: 
environmental, social and governance. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Panel A of Table 1 provides an overview of the events. As can be noted from Panel A, most events occur 
in 2012, while the lowest number of events occur in 2014. Regarding the classification of the events into 
the three main CSR categories—environmental (ENV), governance (GOV) and social (SOC)—most 
events belong to the social category (n=830), followed by governance events (n=393) and environmental 
events (n=358). In total, 1,311 major events, caused by 618 firms, were collected between 2011 and 
2014. After categorization into the abovementioned topics, we are left with a total of 1,581 events. 
Recall that one firm can have more than one event occurring per period (year) and that deviations in the 
starting number of events to the categorized sum can occur. Furthermore, the number of event counts in 
a certain topic may be larger than the number of total events because one event can affect more than one 
of the three possible dimensions (environment, social, or governance). Panel B of Table 1 highlights 
some concerns exemplarily. Overall, for the hypothesis testing, the textual variables are important, and 
they are gathered by hand. Due to a lack of data availability, the textual variables after the event can be 
collected for 818 events, whereas for the textual variables prior to the event year, only 617 events can 
be considered. 
3.2. Event study methodology 
We follow the event study approach outlined by Brown and Warner (1985). To do so, we define the 
announcement day as the date on which news is released and denote it by day0 and the event period as 
a period consisting of 5, 11, and 21 trading days, including the event day. Thus, the event period is 
denoted as ranging from day-1 to day+0, day-5 to day+5, day-10 to day+10, or day-20 to day+20. The observation 
period encompasses a total of 250 trading days2  for each company i prior to the event, which is 
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commonly referred to as the market model approach. For this approach, daily stock returns are used to 
run an OLS regression on the returns of a stock market index to estimate the model parameters i and i: 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜖?̃?,𝑡, (1)  
where 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = rate of return, company i, dayt, 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 = rate of return, stock market index m, dayt, 
𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 = regression coefficients, company i, and 
𝜖?̃?,𝑡 = error term, company i, dayt. 
Following this approach, i and i are then used to calculate expected returns 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 for each company i 
and every dayt. 
 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 (2)  
 
Following the approach of Eckbo (2007), a subtraction of the expected return from the actual return 
yields abnormal return 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 , which can be interpreted as being conditional on the event only and 
unconditional on market influences. 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 (3)  
 
Furthermore, average abnormal returns from the event period are further aggregated over certain days 
(starting at t1 through t2) to compute a CAR 𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2), as done by Halpern (1983). This allows for the 
detection of abnormal returns attributable to the announcement, even though they might have occurred 
right before the official announcement (e.g., due to information leaks or insider trading) or immediately 
after it (e.g., delayed publication of announcement).3 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 (4)  
 
For the event study, we refer to daily stock price data provided by Bloomberg for each firm that shows 
a certain event within the time period considered. The reference markets, i.e., the stock market index, is 
given by the largest index of the country in which the firm has its headquarters, i.e., firms from Germany 
are analysed with respect to the DAX, and US firms are analysed with respect to the S&P 500. 
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3.3. Textual analysis and measures 
We use computer-assisted textual analysis to measure firm-specific CSR disclosure. Compared to 
traditional approaches for measuring CSR disclosure—such as content analysis and ratings from 
external data providers—textual analysis enables researchers to analyse large amounts of text based on 
objective and replicable techniques. With the increase in computing power, textual analysis is 
increasingly used in CSR disclosure research (Hummel & Rotzel, 2019; Melloni, Caglio, & Perego, 
2017; Mittelbach-Hoermanseder, Hummel, & Rammerstorfer, 2019; Muslu, Mutlu, Radhakrishnan, & 
Tsang, 2019; Nazari, Hrazdil, & Mahmoudian, 2017). 
First, we collect the annual reports from each firm that experienced a negative CSR event for both the 
reporting period before and after the event (see figure 1). Thus, we include two subsequent annual 
reports. Next, we apply various pre-processing procedures to the text files to enhance the comparability 
of the text.4 We then construct topic-specific disclosure measures to assess the extent of CSR disclosure 
among the three categories, “environmental,” “social” and “governance,” according to a procedure that 
was first developed by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2014) and refined in the context of CSR disclosure by 
Hummel et al. (2017) and Hummel and Rotzel (2019). Our topic-specific disclosure measures are 
constructed as follows. 
First, for each category, we define search terms to broadly capture the topic. More precisely, we search 
the reports for the occurrence of the words “ecology”5 for environmental disclosure, “social” for social 
disclosure and “governance” for governance disclosure. We then construct twenty word windows 
around the occurrence of the search terms in the reports. These word windows thus include the nine 
words preceding the search term, the search term and the ten words following the search term. We collect 
all twenty word windows to build a topic vocabulary for each search term. This reflects the topics more 
broadly than the search terms. Our topic-specific disclosure measures (discl_env, discl_social and 
discl_gov) are then calculated as the similarity between each report and the topic vocabularies.6 The 
scores range between 0 and 1, with higher scores reflecting stronger similarity with the respective topic-
specific vocabulary. Finally, based on the event date, the disclosure measures are divided into disclPRIOR 
and disclPOST, the former resulting from the analysis of the report published in the financial year prior to 
the event, namely, t-1, and the latter for the year of the event, corresponding to year t (see figure 1). 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
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3.4. Hypothesis testing 
For our first hypothesis on the market reactions to a negative CSR-related event, we use a simple t-test 
to test if the average abnormal return is significantly different from zero for each ESG category. The 
calculation of the abnormal return is described in Section 3.2. 
To test our second hypothesis, we run the following regression for all ESG categories (environmental, 
social and governance) separately: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅 + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization. A negative coefficient for disclPRIOR 
indicates stronger market reactions for firms with more prior topic-specific CSR disclosure and thus a 
loss in trust of investors in the firm-specific CSR reporting with respect to the concerned category. 
To test our third hypothesis, we run the following regression for each ESG category (environmental, 
social and governance) separately: 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 = ARi,t + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑐 . 
We expect a negative relationship, as the event may lead to an increase in reporting on the topic. 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics for our disclosure measures and control 
variables. Consistent with the literature (Hummel et al., 2017; Hummel & Rotzel, 2019), the mean values 
of the disclosure measures are rather low, thereby reflecting the low presence of these topics in firms’ 
annual reports. As expected, the mean values for the disclPOST measures are slightly larger than for the 
disclPRIOR measures. A comparison of the different ESG categories shows that the disclosure measures 
indicate the highest presence of governance topics among annual reports, followed by social topics and 
environmental topics. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
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4.2. Results of hypothesis testing 
Table 3 displays the CAARs of all tested event windows for the events grouped along the three ESG 
categories as well as for a cumulative textual variable covering all three categories. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
On average, the abnormal returns are negative for all events. The significance is not that clear, as the 
different methods mentioned do not provide unambiguous results. Although the abnormal returns are on 
average negative, which is consistent with the negative characteristic of the concerns, the market does 
not react in only a negative way. This finding is consistent with other event studies, such as Kruger 
(2015). Specifically, some of the events are associated with positive abnormal returns and thus appear 
to be positively evaluated with regard to firms’ future financial performance. Table 4 displays the 
descriptive statistics for the resulting abnormal returns up to 10 days prior and 10 days after the event. 
The table indicates that approximately 17 percent of the events have abnormal returns that are 
significantly different from zero on certain dates. As expected, we mainly reveal negative returns for the 
CSR-related events, which strongly supports hypothesis H1 and is consistent with the evidence of prior 
studies (Heflin & Wallace, 2017; Kruger, 2015). 
 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Table 4 shows the results for all abnormal returns up to the maximum length of the 20-day event window. 
It presents the mean, median, maximum and minimum values, as well as the number of calculated 
abnormal returns over all events. The highest abnormal average return is observable for AR0; the longer 
the distance to the event day, the smaller the abnormal return becomes. Based on Table 4, we run OLS 
regressions on the abnormal returns of all days covered in the longest event period, with +/- 10 days, as 
well as on CARs for all distinguished event windows. Table 5 outlines the results for the event date, as 
well as the CAR between the day prior the event and the event day itself.7 
From hypothesis H2, we examine whether firms with more topic-specific CSR disclosure prior to the 
event have different market reactions compared to firms with fewer CSR disclosures. These results are 
presented in Table 5. 8  For social and governance events, we observe a negative and significant 
relationship between prior-event CSR disclosure and abnormal returns. This implies that firms with 
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higher CSR disclosure before the event experience stronger negative market reactions. One potential 
explanation for this is linked to the trust of investors; it could be that investors have higher expectations 
towards firms with higher CSR disclosure to be better prepared for and less likely to experience a 
negative CSR event and thus more importantly update their expectations and beliefs about firms’ 
prospects. This finding is contrary to those of Blacconiere and Patten (1994) and Heflin and Wallace 
(2017), but these studies focus on intra-industry market reactions and thus on firms that do not directly 
experience the negative CSR event. Our results therefore make a remarkable contribution to prior 
findings by revealing that CSR disclosure “shields” firms from negative market reactions only if they 
are not directly related to the event; if firms are directly affected by an event, the respective disclosure 
“damages” these firms. A possible explanation for this phenomenon could be that, when analysing 
industry-wide events, prior studies implicitly measure how companies are prepared to address broader 
future consequences resulting from the event. We, in contrast, investigate company-specific events and 
disclosure. The findings thus indicate the importance of firms aligning their CSR strategy, CSR 
performance and CSR disclosure and refraining from greenwashing. In line with Kruger (2015), we find 
a positive coefficient for firm size, suggesting that larger firms are in a better position than smaller firms 
to absorb negative news.9 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------- 
With regard to our last hypothesis, H3, the results are displayed in Table 6. For both social- and 
governance-related events, we find negative and significant coefficients for abnormal returns, thereby 
indicating that stronger negative market reactions are associated with greater post-event CSR disclosure. 
This finding is consistent with prior studies that document an increase in CSR disclosure after the 
occurrence of a negative CSR event (Blanc et al., 2013; Heflin & Wallace, 2017; Patten, 1992). While 
prior studies mainly focus on firms in the same industry other than the directly affected firm, our results 
show that this relation holds not only for industry-wide shocks but also for firm-specific events. Thus, 
these firms attempt to re-establish investors’ trust and confidence in their handling of the crisis through 
increased CSR disclosure. However, in connection with the results of H2, confirming a negative 
relationship between abnormal returns and prior CSR disclosure, firms must be cautious because such a 
disclosure strategy may backfire in the case of subsequent CSR events. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------- 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the market reactions to firm-specific negative CSR events and the respective 
CSR disclosure, both before and after the occurring event. We focus on the reactions of both investors 
and the concerned firms. For the former, we analyse the relationship between prior-event CSR disclosure 
and market reactions; for the latter, we investigate how firms’ CSR disclosure is affected by market 
reactions after the event. We apply an event study technique and focus on abnormal returns. For the 
measurement of CSR disclosure, we apply computer-assisted textual analysis and calculate similarity 
scores with respect to the three ESG categories (environmental, social and governance). 
With respect to CSR disclosure, our results show that market reactions are stronger for firms with high 
levels of topic-specific CSR disclosure prior to the event. Thus, there seems to be an effect on the trust 
of investors, updating their expectations about future firm performance more importantly when prior 
topic-specific CSR disclosure is high. This finding complements prior findings in the literature, showing 
that firms that are not directly involved in the event but are affected because they are in the same industry 
and might face future regulatory actions can protect themselves from harsh market reactions through 
CSR disclosure. In our study, we focus only on firms that are directly involved in the CSR event, which 
drives the different findings of our study. In a next step, we investigate whether firms adjust their CSR 
disclosure after the event, and we find that the stronger the market reactions are, the stronger the 
increases in CSR disclosure after the event. This finding is consistent with those of prior studies, thereby 
indicating that both types of firms—those that are directly involved and those that are only indirectly 
involved—increase their CSR disclosure after the occurrence of an event. However, our results hold 
only for two of the three ESG categories—social and governance-related events. For the environment, 
we do not find any significance. 
As with all studies, our study is subject to some limitations, which give rise to further research. First, 
the selection of events is based on the REPRisk® database. Although the database provides by far the 
most comprehensive overview of negative CSR-related events, we cannot rule out that the selection of 
events and, in particular, the classification into “major” events is biased towards certain firms or 
industries. Future studies might draw on other databases (such as the KLD database that is used by 
Kruger (2015)) and replicate our findings. Second, the typical criticism of the use of computer-assisted 
textual analysis applies. In particular, our measure of disclosure on ESG issues only broadly covers the 
extent of firm disclosure. Due to large differences in single events, we refrained from more granular 
topic-specific disclosure measures, which might be another avenue for future research.   
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1 The results obtained by Heflin and Wallace (2017) suggest that this increase in disclosure reflects real improvements in 
 firms’ CSR performance and is thus not merely “window-dressing”. 
2  A variation in the trading days between 120 and 250 days does not alter the results. 
3  The abnormal returns of each individual company i can also be aggregated over time (starting at t1 through t2) to 
compute the CARs 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠(𝑡1,𝑡2) for that company. These CARs within a certain topic can further be aggregated to CAARs. 
4  These pre-processing procedures include the elimination of numbers, sample firm names and stop words (based on a 
 word list provided by McDonald (2016) and the application of a stemming algorithm. 
5  We also considered the term “environmental,” but as our word lists reveals, the term is too broad in a company context. 
6 More precisely, the measure is calculated as the cosine similarity between a vector that reflects the frequency of words in 
 firms’ report and a vector that reflects the frequency of the words of the topic vocabulary. In addition, a term weighting 
 procedure is incorporated (i.e., term frequency inverse document frequency (tfidf)) to adjust a word’s weight based on 
how (un)usual the word is (Loughran & McDonald, 2016).  
7  All other days with abnormal returns or CARs reveal no significant results. 
8  In line with Jensen (1986), we also used book leverage and liquidity as measures of agency concerns, but together with 
 size, we do not find any significant relationship of these variables with the abnormal returns resulting from the RepRisk 
events. 
9  Recall that the mainly negative sign allows for this conclusion. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 Overview of CSR-related concern 
Panel A   
Year Number of events ENV GOV  SOC 
2011 435 120 82 233 
2012 518 131 140 247 
2013 394 78 107 209 
2014 234 29 64 141 
Total 1,581 358 393 830 
No. of firms 1,011 259 269 483 
Panel B     
Category Date Firm (ISIN) Event 
ENV, SOC 29/01/2013 
Dana Gas PJSC 
AED000701014 
Flooding of Egyptian village of Fares due to fracking 
GOV 03/07/2013 
Royal Bank of 
Canada 
CA7800871021 
Manipulation of the Libor 
SOC 02/07/2013 
Daimler Car 
DE0007100000 
Toxic car parts in Chinese cars 
SOC 18/11/2011 
Siemens AG 
DE0007236101 
Supply of surveillance technology to repressive regimes 
Panel A of this table provides an overview of the event distribution per year and the respective number of firms. The number 
of firms and events may deviate, as one firm can have more than one event per period (year). Additionally, the number of event 
counts in a certain topic may be larger than the number of events, as events can affect more than one of the three possible 
dimensions (environment, governance, or social). Overall, without classification, we have 1,581 events that are further 
classified into one or more categories—social, governance or environmental. The events can be completely different in their 
severity, as outlined in Panel B, which highlights some concerns exemplarily. Therefore, we also expect that the outcome in 
terms of cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal returns may not be easily interpretable. 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics CSR disclosures 
 discl_envPRIOR discl_govPRIOR discl_socPRIOR 
 Mean  0.005316  0.050008  0.039682 
 Median  0.003541  0.032246  0.032513 
 Maximum  0.048570  0.241273  0.207151 
 Minimum  0.000287  0.003985  0.003692 
 Std. Dev.  0.005998  0.042751  0.027134 
 Skewness  3.493801  1.511991  2.013273 
 Kurtosis  18.38375  5.587212  9.020970 
 Observations 585  585  585 
 discl_envPOST discl_govPOST discl_socPOST 
 Mean  0.005464  0.050756  0.040526 
 Median  0.003592  0.030371  0.032721 
 Maximum  0.067782  0.249976  0.189041 
 Minimum  0.000114  0.003985  0.002959 
 Std. Dev.  0.006688  0.043548  0.029272 
 Skewness  4.195902  1.396816  2.145306 
 Kurtosis  27.16980  4.977154  9.177702 
 Observations  770  770  770 
 This table provides the descriptive statistics for the textual measures. 
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Table 3 Cumulative abnormal results 
 
 
.
This table shows the cumulative average abnormal returns of all tested event windows for the negative events grouped into 
either the ESG categories or cumulated across all topics. The column CAAR Type indicates the window, CAAR Value, the 
CARs within a topic, and No. of CARs, the number of CARs considered, whereas the remaining columns provide different test 
statistics for testing whether the resulting CAARs are significantly different from zero (H0=CAAR=0). Herein, we distinguish 
Patell Z and Adjusted Patell Z, as suggested by Patell (1976) and Kolari and Pynnönen (2010), respectively. 
Environment CAAR Type CAAR Value pos:neg CAR No. of CARs Patell Z Adjusted Patell Z 
5 Day  (-2, 2) -0.0083 165:193 358 -3.7838 -3.8329 
10 Day (-5, 5) -0.0082 169:189 358 -2.8075 -2.844 
20 Day (-10, 10) -0.0177 168:190 358 -4.5453 -4.6044 
Governance      
5 Day  (-2, 2) -0.0017 199:194 393 -0.5236 -0.5137 
10 Day (-5, 5) -0.003 187:206 393 -0.4827 -0.4736 
20 Day (-10, 10) -0.0022 186:207 393 -0.6487 -0.6364 
Social       
5 Day  (-2, 2) 0.0089 398:432 830 2.7335 2.6536 
10 Day (-5, 5) -0.0062 405:425 830 -3.0368 -2.948 
20 Day (-10, 10) -0.0212 395:435 830 -6.0294 -5.8532 
All       
5 Day (-2, 2) -0.0022 653:712 1365 -2.9062 -2.7369 
10 Day (-5, 5) -0.0016 655:705 1360 -1.2066 -1.0184 
20 Day (-10, 10) -0.0047 631:714 1345 -3.1813 -3.0901 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of abnormal returns 
Table 41 
Descriptive statistics of abnormal returns 
Day -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 
 Mean -0.000457 -0.000593 0.000616 -0.000152 0.000826 -0.000275 -0.000514 -0.000382 -0.000892 -0.000506 -0.001238 
 Median -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0006 
 Maximum 0.1657 0.2331 0.1536 0.14 0.2445 0.1262 0.1324 0.2354 0.1815 0.4097 0.1453 
 Minimum -0.2955 -0.0939 -0.2216 -0.1424 -0.1214 -0.1321 -0.1493 -0.1199 -0.2508 -0.295 -0.401 
 Std. Dev. 0.019532 0.01813 0.017287 0.018213 0.018711 0.016662 0.016987 0.017565 0.020295 0.024108 0.023108 
 Observations 1308 1303 1303 1308 1309 1309 1309 1304 1310 1308 1304 
            
Day  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Mean  0.000421 -0.00066 3.23E-05 -0.000234 0.000269 -0.000698 -0.000103 -0.000713 2.35E-05 0.000107 
 Median  0.0002 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.00025 -0.0003 -4.74E-05 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 
 Maximum  0.2225 0.1682 0.1733 0.147 0.41 0.0997 0.2343 0.0916 0.4097 0.1515 
 Minimum  -0.2495 -0.1144 -0.2215 -0.1356 -0.1733 -0.401 -0.248 -0.2229 -0.2036 -0.198 
 Std. Dev.  0.020044 0.016392 0.0178 0.017776 0.019825 0.021718 0.01933 0.018017 0.020097 0.018272 
 Observations  1309 1304 1303 1304 1309 1310 1307 1306 1304 1306 
            
 This table shows the results for all abnormal returns up to the maximum length of the 20-day event window. It presents the mean, median, maximum and minimum values, as well as the number of 
calculated abnormal returns over all events.
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Table 5 Regression Analysis Prior Event 
Table 5 
Prior-event CSR disclosure and abnormal returns  
Day 0 Social Governance Ecology All 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
SIZE 0.000873 ** 0.0401 0.000774 * 0.0683 0.000795 * 0.0618 0.000805 * 0.0578 
disclPRIOR -0.060493 ** 0.0387 -0.031304 * 0.0837 -0.079113  0.5534 -0.070168 ** 0.0457 
c -0.013061 * 0.082 -0.012144  0.1099 -0.013684 * 0.0712 -0.012024  0.1123 
R-squared 0.013474   0.011289   0.006782   0.012995   
Adjusted R-squared 0.010078   0.007885   0.003363   0.009597   
S.E. of regression 0.01883   0.018851   0.018894   0.018835   
Sum squared resid. 0.206015   0.206471   0.207412   0.206115   
Log likelihood 1492.655   1492.009   1490.681   1492.513   
Durbin-Watson stat 2.015536   2.015595   2.03272   2.011496   
Observations 584   584   584   584   
CAR (day 0 + day (-1)) Social   Governance Ecology All 
 Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
SIZE 0.001312 ** 0.0306 0.001163 * 0.0552 0.001185 * 0.0515 0.001206 ** 0.0464 
disclPRIOR -0.100498 ** 0.0173 -0.047344 * 0.0711 -0.116406  0.5461 -0.147069 ** 0.0298 
c -0.019658 * 0.0667 -0.018628 * 0.0858 -0.020796 * 0.0552 -0.018271 * 0.0909 
R-squared 0.016396   0.0123   0.007359   0.014789   
Adjusted R-squared 0.013005   0.008895   0.003936   0.011392   
S.E. of regression  0.027166   0.027222   0.02729   0.027188   
Sum squared resid 0.428028   0.42981   0.431961   0.428727   
Log likelihood  1276.443   1275.231   1273.777   1275.967   
F-statistic  4.834226   3.611558   2.149825   4.353195   
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.008276   0.027619   0.117432   0.013289   
Obs. 584   584   584   584   
 
  
This table shows that there is a significant relationship between the abnormal return at day zero and the day before, caused by a certain concern 
and the CSR disclosure (textual analysis based on the report prior the event) prior the event. Coefficients and probabilities are given in columns 
two and three. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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 Table 6 Regression Analysis Post Event 
 
 
Table 6 
Abnormal returns and post-event CSR disclosure  
Text Post Social Governance Ecology All 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
AR0 -0.114542 ** 0.0486 -0.169559 ** 0.0541 -0.003587  0.7748 -0.095896 ** 0.042 
SIZE 0.000163  0.7938 -0.000915  0.3332 -0.000356 *** 0.0084 -0.000369  0.4657 
C 0.037877 *** 0.0005 0.067611 *** 0 0.011553 *** 0 0.039014 *** 0 
Observations 770   770   770   770   
R-squared 0.005095   0.0063   0.009249   0.00628   
Adjusted R-squared 0.002501   0.003709   0.006666   0.003688   
S.E. of regression 0.029108   0.044129   0.006292   0.023635   
Sum squared resid 0.64984   1.493628   0.030369   0.428456   
Log likelihood 1632.224   1311.813   2811.59   1792.591   
Durbin-Watson stat 1.916817   2.011169   1.881242   1.951571   
 This table shows the results for Hypothesis 3. Coefficients and according probabilities are given. . ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively 
